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CHAPTER 4 
Workmen's Compensation Law 
LAURENCE S. LOCKE 
§4.1. Common employment doctrine: Abolition by legislative 
amendment. The 1971 SuRVEY year marks the last days of the com-
mon employment doctrine as a defense in third-party suits by employ-
ees covered under the Workmen's Compensation Act.1 Responding to 
the Supreme Judicial Court's refusal to disturb the common employ-
ment doctrine,2 the legislature, rather than merely revising the de-
fense of common employment, abolished it totally with respect to all 
causes of action arising on and after January 24, 1972.3 Since injuries 
occurring before that date are still affected by the common employment 
doctrine, lawyers and courts will still be obliged to deal with its intri-
cacies, and injured workmen and their dependents will still suffer from 
its inequities4 for a few more years. 
The common employment doctrine bars all those engaged in a com-
mon enterprise being carried out by an insured employer from succeed-
ing in actions at law to recover damages for personal injuries. The 
doctrine is based on Sections 15, 18, and 24 of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act.5 Section 24 provides that unless an employee affirma-
tively reserves his common law right to recover damages for a personal 
injury, he will be held to have waived that right. Section 18 imposes 
on an insured employer the obligation to pay compensation to em-
ployees of uninsured contractors doing the insured employer's work, 
where the work done is part of the business of the insured and not 
merely ancillary and incidental thereto. The effect of Section 18 is to 
make the insured employer the "statutory employer" of the employees 
of his uninsured subcontractors. Section 15 establishes the procedure 
LAURENCE S. LocKE is a partner in the Boston law firm of Horvitz, Petkun and Locke, 
and the author of the Massachusetts Practice Series volume on workmen's compensation. 
§4.1. 1 G.L.,c.152,§§1-76. 
2 In Brown v. Marr Equip. Corp., 355 Mass. 724, 726, 247 N.E.2d 352, 353 (1969), the 
Supreme Judicial Court, notwithstanding its critical appraisal of the doctrine, stated: 
"[l]f the doctrine is to undergo revision such revision should be accomplished by the 
Legislature." 
3 Acts of 1971, c. 941, §2, amendingG.L., c.l52, §15. 
4 Some of the inequities are discussed in Locke, 29 Mass. Practice Series §665 (1968) 
[hereinafter cited as Locke], and 2 Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation 
§§72.32 to 72.33 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Larson). 
5 These three sections of the act are explained in detail in Locke §§152-155, 651, 663-
665. 
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for third-party suits in cases where the injury is caused by a "person 
other than the insured." 
These three sections in combination have resulted in the es-
tablishment of a rule, governing common law actions for per-
sonal injuries suffered by employees of the contractor and of sub-
contractors where the work is done under a general contractor 
who is an "insured person," that might not be apparent from a 
mere reading of the statute. The insurance of the general contrac-
tor or "common employer" ... throws its shadow over the whole 
work. In that shadow . . . a cause of action for negligence caus-
ing a compensable personal injury cannot grow .... [O]ne en-
gaged in that common employment as contractor, sub-contractor 
or employee cannot be a "person other than the insured" within 
section 15, and the injured employee has no option to sue him at 
common law. An insurer, whether of the common employer or 
of a sub-contractor, paying compensation to an employee, cannot 
recover over under section 15 against a negligent contractor, sub-
contractor or employee engaged in the "common employment" 
for the insurer succeeds only to the rights of the. employee receiv-
ing compensation. . . . In the application of this rule, it is im-
material whether the sub-contractors are insured or not. . . . The 
essential thing is the existence of a "common employer" who is 
an "insured person" under section 18 ... and who is having 
work done ... , which work is part of or process in his trade or 
business .... 6 
The doctrine of common employment was created in White v. George 
A. Fuller Co./ a 1917 case involving a suit against a general con-
tractor by an employee of an uninsured subcontractor for the payment 
of damages for personal injuries. Under the terms of Section 18 as then 
written, the employee had a right to workmen's compensation from 
the general contractor's insurance carrier as though the employee were 
immediately employed by the general contractor. In response to the 
obligation for compensation thus placed on the general contractor 
by the statute, the Supreme Judicial Court extended the general con-
tractor's immunity against suits by his own employees by providing 
for an immunity as well against suits by the employees of uninsured 
subcontractors. The employees of uninsured subcontractors were to 
have no greater rights than the immediate employees of the general 
contractor. The narrow immunity created by the Court in White, 
however, was soon expanded beyond all bounds. Section 18 was con-
verted from a grant of compensation coverage for employees of unin-
sured subcontractors to a grant of immunity for all employers on a 
common project whether or not they had any obligation to provide 
compensation protection for employees of uninsured subcontractors.8 
6 Clark v. M. W. Leahy Co., 300 Mass. 565, 568-569, 16 N.E.2d 57, 58-59 (1938). 
7 226Mass. I, 114N.E.829(1917). 
8 Locke §665. 
' 
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Chapter 941 of the Acts of 1971 eliminates the effect of the common 
employment doctrine by restricting the employer immunity to the im-
mediate employer of the injured employee, thereby abolishing even the 
limited immunity established by White. The amendment adds the fol-
lowing sentence to Section 15: 
Nothing in this section or in section eighteen or twenty-four shall 
be construed to bar an action at law for damages for personal in-
juries or wrongful death by an employee against any person other 
than the insured person employing such employee and liable for 
payment of the compensation provided by this chapter for the 
employee's personal injury or wrongful death and said insured 
person's employees.9 
Under the amendment, if an insured person is to acquire an immunity 
against a suit for personal injury or wrongful death, two conditions 
established by the amendment must be met: first, the insured person 
must employ the injured or deceased employee, and second, the insured 
person must be liable for the payment of compensation for the injury 
or death of the employee. If the conditions are met, the employer has 
his immunity. The effect of the amendment is that the insured contrac-
tor, whose insurance carrier must pay compensation under the provi-
sions of Section 18 for the injury or death of an employee of an unin-
sured subcontractor, is now liable as a third party for damages in ex-
cess of compensation if his negligence or that of his employees caused 
the injury. Where the Court has extended the insured employer's im-
munity to protect his employees from an action at law by a fellow 
employee, 10 the amendment explicitly preserves the protection. Of 
course, if at the time of injury the plaintiff or his decedent was not in 
the service of the defendant11 or the injury did not arise out of and 
in the course of employment, 12 the compensation act itself has no 
application and the parties have the same legal rights and duties as 
members of the general public. 
§4.2. Common employment doctrine: Employer's liability for con-
tribution or indemnity to third party: Indemnification based on active-
passive negligence theory. In Stewart v. Roy Bros., 1 the plaintiff 
was employed by Standard Storage Co. (Standard), a "public ware-
houseman" that stored chemicals for 15 different companies. At the 
time of the accident, Stewart was engaged in loading ethyl acetate in-
to a tank trailer owned and operated by Roy Bros. (Roy), a "certified 
carrier" in the business of transporting liquid and dry freight. While 
9 Acts of 1971, c. 941, §1, amendingG.L., c.l52, §15. 
10 Caira v. Caira, 296 Mass. 448, 6 N.E.2d 431 (1937); Dresser v. New Hampshire 
Structural Steel Co., 296 Mass. 97, 4 N.E.2d 1012 (1936). See also 1968 Ann. Surv. Mass. 
Law §16.9; Locke §652. 
11 White v. Checker Taxi Co., 284 Mass. 73, 187 N.E. 49 (1933); Ross v. John Han-
cock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 222 Mass. 560, Ill N.E. 390 (1916). 
12 Levin v. Twin Tanners, Inc., 318 Mass. 13,60 N.E.2d6 (1945). 
§4.2. 1 1970Mass.Adv.Sh.l605,265N.E.2d357. 
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so engaged, Stewart was accidentally sprayed with the ethyl acetate, a 
highly flammable substance which Standard stored for Union Car-
bide, and a fire at the front of the trailer ignited his clothing. Stewart 
was severely burned. He received workmen's compensation from Stan-
dard's insurance company and brought a third-party action against 
Roy. Roy impleaded Standard for indemnity. The jury brought in a 
verdict for Stewart against Roy and for Roy against Standard in the 
same amount, under leave reserved, after the trial judge had denied 
motions for a directed verdict for both defendants. 
Defendants Roy and Standard appealed to the Supreme Judicial 
Court. After holding that there was sufficient evidence of negligence 
on the part of Roy and that Stewart had neither assumed the risk nor 
been guilty of contributory negligence, the Court considered three 
remaining issues: whether a verdict for the plaintiff should stand de-
spite a jury finding of common employment; whether the third party 
had a right to seek indemnity from the plaintiff's employer despite the 
fact that a direct suit against the employer would have been barred 
by the compensation act; and whether Massachusetts would recognize 
a general tort doctrine of indemnity based upon the theory of active 
and passive negligence. The Court reiterated familiar law on the first 
issue, did not reach the second, and on the third enunciated the gen-
eral proposition that the Commonwealth would not embrace the doc-
trine of active-passive negligence as a basis for indemnity. 
The Court first considered the issue of common employment. In 
response to special questions, the jury had found that the loading and 
storage of ethyl acetate for Union Carbide by Standard and the load-
ing, transporting, and delivery of ethyl acetate for Union Carbide by 
Roy was in each instance a part of and process in the business of Union 
Carbide and not merely ancillary and incidental thereto. The Court 
held as a matter of law that, notwithstanding the jury's special findings, 
the doctrine of common employment did not apply because the avail-
able facts "plainly" indicated that the work of Roy was not a part of 
or process in the business of Union Carbide. The Court observed that 
since every business was dependent in some way on transportation, 
transportation was not necessarily a "part of or process in" every busi-
ness.2 The delivery of material to an insured employer and the ship-
ment of its finished product would not usually be considered a part of 
or process in that insured employer's business. Only if the employer 
itself usually carried on these activities might they be considered a 
part of its business. 3 "[T]here was no evidence to indicate how Union 
Carbide "usually distributed chemicals, whether it ever used its own 
trucks for that purpose, or to what extent it used common carriers 
other than Roy .... " 4 In the absence of such evidence, the Court 
2This proposition had been originally stated by the Court in Cannon v. Crowley, 318 
Mass. 373, 376, 61 N.E.2d 662, 665 (1945). 
3 Caton v. Winslow Bros. and Smith Co., 309 Mass. 150, 34 N.E.2d 638 (1941). 
4 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1605, 1614, 265 N.E.2d 357, 364. The problem of whether an 
activity is a part of or processs in a business is discussed generally in Locke §155. 
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saw no basis for the trial jury's finding that Roy's transportation ac-
tivities were part of Union Carbide's business. Accordingly, it was held 
that the work engaged in by Roy had been outside the common em-
ployment. 
Although with respect to the common employment issue the Court 
had been on familiar ground, it then faced the issues arising from 
Roy's indemnification impleader of Standard, the plaintiff's employer. 
Roy relied chiefly on the theory that Standard had committed "active" 
negligence, while at most Roy had been passively negligent. On this 
issue the jury had found for Roy. The question for the Supreme Judi-
cial Court was "whether the third party plaintiff (Roy) is entitled to 
indemnity from an insured employer (Standard) whose negligence has 
caused or contributed to cause the injury of its employee (Stewart) . 
• • • " 5 That question was one of first impression in the Common-
wealth. Two sub-issues had been briefed and reported: (I) whether the 
compensation act protected an insured employer from such liability; 
and (2) whether the Commonwealth would recognize the doctrine of 
active-passive negligence. The Court dealt solely and summarily with 
the second: "The doctrine of active-passive negligence . . . has not 
been recognized in this Commonwealth nor are we willing to embrace 
this doctrine now."6 The Court noted that in Massachusetts the gen-
eral rule barred indemnity or contribution among joint tort-feasors: 
"Indemnity is permitted only when one does not join in the negligent 
act but is exposed to derivative or vicarious liability for the wrongful 
act of another."7 Such was not the case with Standard. The Court was 
unwilling to change the general rule by embracing the doctrine of 
active-passive negligence. 
The Stewart decision leaves unanswered the question of whether 
the compensation act will have any effect upon the insured employer's 
liability for contribution or indemnity to a tort-feasor. The question 
may have increased significance in view of the abolition of the com-
mon employment defense since the number of third-party suits will 
undoubtedly increase, and many third-party suits will involve the in-
timate interplay between the third party and the employer. In the con-
struction industry, for instance, the third party's liability is often merely 
"vicarious" or "derivative," and the plaintiff's employer may be the 
active tort-feasor. Courts have been quite willing to hold an insured 
employer liable to a third party where there is an express or implied 
contract for indemnification.8 The majority of courts, however, have 
not been willing to overlook the exclusive remedy provision of the 
compensation act in the absence of a contract to indemnify, even in 
states which allow contribution among joint tort-feasors.9 A signifi-
5 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1605, 1615,265 N.E.2d357, 364. 
6 Id. at 1615,265 N.E.2dat365. 
7 ld. at 1617, 265 N.E.2d at 365. The general rule is expressed in Gray v. Boston Gas 
Light Co., II4 Mass. 149, 154 (1873). The Court's discussion in Stewart contains a full 
citation of authorities. ld. at 1616-1617, 265 N.E.2d at 365. 
8 Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956). 
• 2 Larson §76.21 and cases cited therein. 
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cant number of courts do find an obligation to indemnify on the part 
of the employer by considering the relationship of the employer and 
the third party as separate from that of the employer and his injured 
employee. The latter courts treat the separate relationship as giving 
rise to an independent duty on the part of the employer to refrain from 
negligent acts which would impose a liability (in Massachusetts mere-
ly "derivative or vicarious" liability) on the third party with respect 
to the employee.1o 
The cases which find an independent duty on the part of the em-
ployer seem more in line with the goal of making the compensation 
act an exclusive remedy for the injured employee and with the moral 
concept underlying third-party actions. They are also more in keeping 
with the specific provisions of the Massachusetts compensation act 
and with the relevant decisions of the Supreme Judicial Court. The 
grand design of the compensation act is based on liability without 
fault; the employee gives up his right to sue his employer for full tort 
damages in return for a modest but assured subsistence benefit. The 
employer receives immunity from unlimited tort liability to his em-
ployee in return for providing insurance for the prescribed compen-
sation benefits. The exchange of rights and duties that is the essential 
element of workmen's compensation does not justify depriving a third 
party of his right to contribution or indemnity where the employer 
has breached an independent duty to the third party. There are two 
separate legal consequences: the third party's duty to pay damages 
to the employee, and the third party's right to receive recompense 
from the one whose culpable act gave rise to the third party's obliga-
tion to pay the damages. That the ultimate wrongdoer happens to be 
the plaintiff's employer is irrelevant to the wrongdoer's duty to in-
demnify the third party on whom vicarious liability was imposed. 
When the employer fulfilled its statutory duty to take out compensa-
tion insurance, it purchased immunity solely from liability to its 
employee. "The concept underlying third party actions is to ensure 
that the loss caused by the wrongdoing ultimately falls on the wrong-
doer, while preserving the employee's right to compensation." 11 The 
moral philosophy of liability for fault which justifies the suit by the 
injured employee against the third party should equally impose liabil-
ity upon the ultimate wrongdoer, even where it is the plaintiff's em-
ployer. 
Nothing in the language of the compensation act justifies escalating 
the employer's immunity so as to bar liability to the third party. Sec-
tion 23 states: 
to American Dist. Tel. Co. v. Kittleson, 179 F.2d 946 (8th Cir. 1950); Shell Oil Co. v. 
Foster-Wheeler Corp., 209 F. Supp. 931 (E.D. Ill. 1962), aff'd, 320 F.2d 591 (7th Cir. 
1963); Trial Builders Supply Co. v. Reagan, 235 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 1970); Jones v. Mc-
Dougal-Hartmann Co., 115 Ill. App. 2d 403, 253 N.E.2d 581 (1969); Blackford v. Sioux 
City Dressed Pork, Inc., 254 Iowa 845, 118 N.W.2d 559 (1962); Kentucky Uti!. Co. v. Jack-
sonCountyRuralElec. CooperativeCorp.,438 S.W.2d 788 (Ky. 1968); Lunderberg v. Bier-
man, 241 Minn. 349, 63 N.W.2d 355 (1954). 
11 Locke §661 n.l, citing Furlong v. Cronan, 305 Mass. 464, 26 N .E.2d 382 (1940). 
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If an employee files any claim for, or accepts payment of, com-
pensation on account of personal injury under this chapter, or 
makes any agreement, or submits to a hearing before a member 
of the division under section eight, such action shall constitute a 
release to the insured or self-insurer of all claims or demands at 
law, if any, arising from the injury.12 
By these words, the employee's assertion of his right to compensation 
becomes a release to the insured employer of any possible demands the 
employee might have at law. But how can the words of Section 23 be 
deemed to convert the employee's claim to compensation into a re-
lease of a third party's claims or demands at law against the insured 
employer? The legal injury to the third party from the employer's 
breach of its duty to the third party is an "injury" separate from the 
physical harm to the employee referred to by Section 23. 
The language of Section 23 is strikingly more limited than that of 
the compensation statutes in those states which have barred indemnity 
by the employer. The typical wording of the latter compensation 
statutes provides that the liability of an employer shall be exclusive 
and in place of any other liability whatsoever to such employee, his 
personal representatives, spouse, parents, dependents or next of kin, 
or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages at common law or 
otherwise on account of such injury or death. 13 As pointed out by 
counsel for Roy: "The reasoning of those decisions which favor em-
ployer immunity frequently is that a noncontractual duty to indem-
nify the third party would be an obligation on 'account of such injury' 
to the employee and, therefore, is barred by the language of the sta-
tute."14 No such language appears in the Massachusetts act to pro-
hibit employer indemnification. 
Prior decisions of the Court have permitted actions at law against a 
negligent employer arising from a compensable injury. In King v. Vis-
coloid Co.,JS the parents of a minor child were held to retain their 
right of action for medical expenses and loss of services, despite pay-
ment of compensation to the minor-employee. The employee's waiver 
of common law rights under Section 24 was held not to extend to other 
persons who have separate and independent rights against the em-
ployer. The parent's right of action was stated to be "independent" of 
the employee's right. The employee could not by his own act "waive 
his parent's independent right." A similar result is suggested by two 
cases concerning an employer's liability to its deceased employee's 
dependents, who are not entitled to benefits under the compensation 
act. 16 
A recent case involving a motor vehicle tort rather than a workman's 
12 G.L., c. 152, §23. 
13 2 Larson §76.30. 
14 Brief for Defendant and Third Party Plaintiff (Roy Bros.) at 22. 
15 219Mass. 420,106N.E. 988 (1914). 
16 Cf. Wechslerv. Liner, 328 Mass. 152, 102 N.E.2d 92 (1951); Reidy v. Old Colony Gas 
Co., 315 Mass. 631, 53 N.E.2d 707 (1944). The significance of Wechsler and Reidy are 
discussed in Locke §653. 
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compensation action indicates that the Supreme Judicial Court would 
not hold an employer liable in indemnity to a third party. In O'Mara v. 
H. P. Hood and Sons,i1 in the absence of a showing of gross negli-
gence, the Court barred recovery under the contribution statute18 as 
against the operator of the car in which plaintiff had been a passen-
ger. A right of contribution exists "where two or more persons become 
jointly liable in tort for the same injury to person or property."19 Under 
the terms of the statute, unless the potential contributor would be di-
rectly liable to the injured person, the defendant wrongdoer is not en-
titled to contribution. If a third party against whom a tort suit has 
been brought under S~ction 15 of the Workmen's Compensation Act 
were to seek contribution from the employer as a joint tort-feasor under 
the contribution statute, the O'Mara case suggests that recovery would 
be denied ori the ground that the employer was not directly liable to the 
plaintiff-employee by virtue of Sections 23 and 24 of the act. However, 
the Court itself in O'Mara distinguished the question of indemnity 
from that of contribution.2° 
In sh~rt, this issue is still wide open. Considerations of public policy 
and statutory interpretation both combine to favor holding an em-
ployer liable in indemnity when the third-party liability is merely 
"derivative and vicarious" and the truly culpable wrongdoer is the 
employer. 
§4.3. Third-party suits: Elimination of the election between com-
pensation and tort remedy. When the General Court abolished the 
common employment defense, a companion amendment1 modified 
Section 15 of the Workmen's Compensation Act to eliminate the pre-
vious need to elect between the compensation and tort remedies, and 
to allow either the insurer or the employee to bring a subrogation 
action against the third party. Under the prior law, still applicable 
to all injuries occurring before October 14, 1971, Section 15 required 
the employee to elect between bringing a compensation claim or a tort 
action against the third party. He could not pursue both remedies 
concurrently. If he chose compensation, his right of action against the 
third party vested initially in the insurer as a statutory assignee; but 
if the insurer failed to act seasonably, the employee could proceed 
against the third party on his own. The insurer would be reimbursed 
for the compensation paid, no matter who brought the third-party 
action. If the insurer began the suit, the employee would be entitled 
to only four-fifths of the excess of the recovery over the compensation 
paid, whereas if the employee brought the suit, he would retain the 
entire excess. 2 
The 1971 amendment changes all this. The amendment first provides 
17 1971 Mass.Adv. Sh. 553, 268N.E.2d685. 
18 G.L., c. 231B, §I. 
19 Ibid. 
2o 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 553,555-556,268 N.E.2d685, 687. 
§4.3. 1 Acts of 1971, c. 888, §§I, 2, amendingG.L., c. 152, §15. 
2 Locke §§665, 668-672. 
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that where an injury is caused under circumstances creating a liability 
for damages in a person other than the employer, "the employee shall 
be entitled, without election, to the compensation and other benefits 
provided under this chapter."3 The amendment abolishes the need 
to choose between compensation and the tort remedy. Next it provides: 
"Either the employee or insurer may proceed to enforce the liability 
of such person, but the insurer may not do so unless compensation has 
been claimed or paid under an agreement."4 Thus, although the in-
surer may still control the third-party suit as a statutory assignee if it 
pays compensation under an agreement or if the employee claims com-
pensation,5 it does not have exclusive control or ownership of the 
right of action. If the insurer has not brought suit, the employee may 
do so at any time.6 An employee wishing to bring suit may first bring 
his third-party action and then file his claim for compensation, 
thus maintaining appropriate control over his own rights and reme-
dies. 
The amendment makes other needed changes. It provides that the 
sum recovered shall be for the benefit of the insurer unless the recovery 
is greater than the compensation paid to the employee, "in which 
event the excess shall be retained by or paid to the employee.''7 Reten-
tion by the insurer of 20 percent of the excess recovery in those cases 
where the insurer brought the third-party action is thus eliminated. 
The amendment also clarifies the distribution of costs and interest, 
and ends the confusion as to payment of attorneys' fees. The party 
bringing the action is to retain the costs recovered. Interest is to be 
"apportioned between the insurer and the employee in proportion to 
the amounts received by them respectively, exclusive of interest and 
cost.''8 Similarly, the expense of any attorneys' fees "shall be divided 
between the insurer and the employee in proportion to the amounts 
received by them respectively under [Section 15].''9 The provisions for 
approval of the third-party settlement and the distribution of the pro-
ceeds remain unchanged.IO 
I have previously pointed out: 
Our Massachusetts system is subject to criticism on two grounds, 
one a matter of statutory provision and the other a matter of judi-
cial decision. First, the requirement of an election is unduly tech-
3 Acts of 1971, c. 888,§1. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Furlong v. Cronan, 305 Mass. 464, 467, 26 N.E.2d 382, 385 (1940), construed the 
prior Section 15 as granting ownership of the third-party suit to the in~urer where a 
claim had been filed, even though the insurer contested the claim before the Industrial 
Accident Board. 
6 He previously had to waitl5 months. Locke §669. 
7 Acts of 1971, c. 888, §1. The former provision had permitted the anomalous situation 
in which the 20 percent insurer's recovery might exceed the compensation benefits paid 
to the employee. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 These provisions are descri!Jed in Locke §669. 
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nical and hazardous, and may leave the employee without actual 
relief if his choice proves unsuccessful. Secondly, the court has 
construed the concept of third persons against whom an action at 
law may be brought so as to exclude all persons employed on the 
same project under an insured "common employer," including 
contractors and sub-contractors and their employees. This has 
extended the immunity justifiably granted employers to persons 
who have assumed no obligation under the act to warrant it. 11 
59 
The 1971 Massachusetts legislature, by enacting Chapters 888 and 941 
of the Acts of 1971, has in one year cured the two aforementioned de-
fects, which had persisted since the compensation act was first put on 
the statute books in 1912. 
· §4.4. Other amendments: Compensation orders after confer.ence; 
Depositions of medical witnesses; Presumption for death on premises; 
Coverage of nurses; Increase in weekly incapacity benefits. In its 
most productive year since 1949, the legislature made other very im-
portant reforms in the Massachusetts Workmen's Compensation Act. 
The reforms focused on two continuing problems: the backlog in con-
troverted cases, and the inadequate compensation payments for in-
capacity and death. 
Critics of the Massachusetts compensation system attribute the long 
delay in adjudication of claims to several causes. Insurance compan-
ies have been criticized for unfairly refusing to pay compensation vol-
untarily in cases where they clearly would eventually have to pay, 
thereby forcing into litigation disabled workers who are without com-
pensation when they need it most. 1 For their own part, insurance com-
panies have complained that once claims are accepted, payments 
cannot be stopped without the assent of the employee or the approv-
al of the Industrial Accident Board, even if the insurer has medical 
evidence that the employee is able to return to work.2 Other observ-
ers have noted the lack of authority of members of the board to con-
trol board proceedings or to issu~- temporary orders without formal 
hearing. Finally, some commentators feel that the act could be simpli-
fied so that iss~es now subject to controversy could be eliminated.3 
All of these considerations influenced the reforms enacted in 1971. 
The major innovation is embodied in Chapter 974 of the Acts of 
1971,4 which introduces a new procedural step between the notifica-
tion of the board that a controversy exists as to payment or continu-
ance of compensation and the formal hearing provided by Section 8. 
11 Locke §661. 
§4.4. 1 E.g.,BostonHerald,Oct.l9, 197l,at3,col.l. 
2 The present system is set forth in G.L., c. 152, §6. A summary of the procedure for 
payment of compensation by agreement can be found in Kareske's Case, 250 Mass. 220, 
145 N.E. 301 (1924), and in Locke §417. G.L., c. 152, §29 covers discontinuance of com-
pensation. See also Locke §§424-428. 
3 E.g., Meagher, WearandTear:APopularFallacy, 15BostonB.J. 7 (Oct.l971). 
• AmendingG.L., c. I 52, §7. 
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The new step is a conference before a single Industrial Accident Board 
member, to be held not later than 28 days after notice of a controversy 
is given to the board. The board member is to make "such inquiries 
and investigations as he deems necessary and shall have the power 
to require and receive reports of injury, signed statements of the em-
ployee and other witnesses, medical and hospital reports and records 
and such other oral and written matter as enable him to determine 
whether compensation ... is due."5 It is not required that the "oral 
matter" be sworn testimony or be subject to cross-examination. If the 
issue before the board member is the commencement of compensation 
and if the member determines from all of the available information that 
compensation is due, he is to file forth with a written order for such 
compensation. On the other hand, if the issue before the board member 
is whether compensation already being paid is to be continued, he is 
not restricted to either terminating the compensation entirely or con-
tinuing it unchanged, as under prior law, 6 but also has the power 
given by Chapter 974 to "modify" compensation, that is, to order the 
continuance of compensation in lesser amounts. 
Any party aggrieved by an order arising from the conference may 
request the Division of Industrial Accidents to set the case for a hear-
ing before another board member.7 That hearing would be con-
ducted in accordance with ·long-standing statutory procedures.8 By 
inadvertence, however, Chapter 974 of the Acts of 1971 did not pre-
scribe a time limit within which a request for a hearing must be made. 
Presumably an insurer could begin payments under the order and if, 
months later, it found the payments burdensome, it could ask for a 
hearing. The failure to prescribe a time limit within which a request 
for a hearing must be made gives unwarranted leverage to the insurer 
in negotiations for a lump settlement and places the employee in need-
less uncertainty. A prompt amendment is in order to provide that a 
reasonable time limit, such as 10 days, be established.9 
After a request for a hearing is made, the hearing is to be scheduled 
within three months. Until a decision is rendered, payments are to 
continue in accordance with th~ order that resulted from the confer-
ence. The decision of a single board member after a hearing, however, 
supersedes the order arising from a conference. Once a decision has 
been filed, it is enforceable in the superior court unless a claim of 
review is filed within seven days. 10 Formerly, if the decision of the 
board member at a formal hearing was in favor of commencing compen-
sation to the employee and the insurer claimed a review, payment did 
not begin until after the decision of the reviewing board.ll Whether 
5 Acts of 1971,c. 974. 
6 G.L., c. 152, §29. 
7 Acts of 1971, c. 974. 
8 G.L., c. 152, §8. 
9 Amendments to this effect have been entered as House Bill 1493 (10 days) and Sen-
ate Bill 231 (14 days) for the 1972 legislative session. 
10 Acts of 1971, c. 974, provides that both orders (arising from a conference) and deci-
sions (arising from a hearing) are enforceable under G.L., c. 152, §11. 
II G.L., c. 152, §§8, 10,11. 
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the filing of a claim by the insurer for review under the new procedure 
would similarly act to suspend payment, even if the insurer had been 
making payments under the temporary order of a single member, is 
not explicitly stated in the amendment. The intent of the amendment 
would indicate that payments should be continued, but a further 
amendment is in order to clarify that point. 12 If after a hearing 
the single board member decides that weekly payments made under 
the original order were not warranted, the state treasurer will reim-
burse the insurer and the employee will reimburse the state treasurer. 13 
The 1971 amendment emphatically expresses the legislative intent 
that industrial injury or death be promptly compensated; by giving 
the board member the power to order such payment in cases where 
the insurer now unjustifiably withholds voluntary payment, the legis-
lature will ensure that its intent is carried out. The amendment gives 
the board member substantial authority at an early stage in the pro-
ceedings and should go far to eliminate the staggering backlog of 
undecided cases.l4 
Implementation of the new procedure will require an enlarged staff 
and budget for the Division of Industrial Accidents. More board mem-
bers will be needed if the board is to hold conferences and hearings 
within the prescribed 28- and 90-day time limits. Unfortunately, the 
only provision made by the legislature for such additional staffing is 
Chapter 953 of the Acts of 1971,15 which authorizes the governor to 
recall former members of the board for 90-day periods if the workload 
of the board so requires and the board so requests. The recalled mem-
bers are barred from practicing before the board during the period 
of recall, and their salary is limited to the difference between any re-
tirement pension they may be receiving and the current salary of an 
active board member. Probably few will accept recall under those cir-
cumstances, and therefore it is doubtful that Chapter 953 will fill the 
need for additional board members created by the present backlog of 
controversies and the new conference procedure. The next legislature 
will have to enlarge the membership of the board substantially on 
either a permanent or a temporary basis. 16 
In a related move to strengthen the executive department's respon-
sibility for the performance'of the Division of Industrial Accidents, the 
legislature made the term of the chairman of the Industrial Accident 
Board coterminous with that of the governorY 
Since most cases before the board involve medical questions, diffi-
12 An amendment to this effect has been entered as House Bill 1493 for the 1972 legis-
lative session. 
13 Acts of 1971. c. 974. 
14 The backlog of cases awaiting the attention of the board is large, but until the 
board analyzes its case load to determine the number and the types of cases that are being 
delayed, the exact character and extent of the backlog cannot be known. 
15 Adding§l5A toG.L., c. 23. 
16 An amendment to this effect has been entered as House Bill 1854 for the 1972 legisla-
tive session. 
17 Acts of 1971, c. 907, amendingG.L., c. 23, §15. 
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culty in producing expert medical witnesses at hearings causes many 
delays and postponements. Chapter 882 of the Acts of 1971 18 provides 
for the taking of depositions of medical witnesses and makes such de-
positions admissible in proceedings before the board. The statute 
requires a party to make a written request for the taking of a deposi-
tion, and the division or a board member then has the option to ap-
prove or disapprove the request. Depositions are to be taken for "use 
as medical evidence only" and not for purposes of discovery. The cost 
of stenographic services is to be paid by the party requesting the de-
position, but if the decision is in favor of the employee, his expenses 
for stenographic services are to be added to the award and paid by the 
insurer. This statute will need amendment because it fails to provide 
the board with the power to order depositions without a written re-
quest, and similarly does not obligate the member to authorize a 
deposition when a party makes such a request. 19 The new statute 
also limits the use of depositions to medical testimony only. The 
deposition of any witness, lay or medical, should be permitted and 
admissible in proceedings before the board for all purposes, whether 
discovery or testimony. 
Chapter 702 of the Acts of 1971 20 clarified the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act with respect to the presumption applicable in the 
event of the death or disability of the employee. Prior law had provided 
that in any claim for compensation where the employee had been killed 
or was physically or mentally unable to testify, it was to be presumed, 
in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, that the claim 
was within the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act.21 
However, use of the presumption failed to simplify hearings in cases 
of unwitnessed deaths because the Supreme Judicial Court had held 
that the presumption disappeared upon introduction of substantial 
evidence to the contrary.22 The amended statute provides: 
In any claim for compensation where the employee has been 
killed, or found dead at his place of employment or is physically 
or mentally unable to testify, it shall be prima facie evidence that 
the employee was performing his regular duties on the day of in-
jury or fatality or death or disability and that the claim comes 
within the provisions of this chapter .... 23 [Emphasis added.] 
The emphasized phrases are new. By replacing "presumed in the ab-
sence of substantial evidence to the contrary" with "prima facie evi-
dence," the legislature intended to make sure that even if evidence was 
introduced to show that the injury was not in the course of the em-
18 Amending G.L., c. 152, §5. 
19 An amendment to this effect has been entered as House Bill 1855 for the 1972 legis-
lative session. 
20 AmendingG.L.,c.I52,§7A. 
21 G.L., c. 152,§7A; Locke§221. 
22 LeBlanc's Case, 332 Mass. 334, 125 N.E.2d 129 (1954); Lapinsky's Case, 325 Mass. 
13, 88 N.E.2d 642 (1949). See also Locke §184. 
23 G.L., c. 152,§7A, as amended by Acts of 1971, c. 702. 
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ployee's employment the board could, if it so believed, find that the 
injury arose out of and in the course of employment on the sole basis 
that the employee could not testify because of either death or inca-
pacity. Although it is for the board to decide what weight will be 
given to prima facie evidence, such evidence remains in the case in 
the face of contradictory evidence.24 
By Chapter 81 I of the Acts of 1971,25 the legislature extended the 
coverage of workmen's compensation to nurses employed by religious, 
charitable, and educational institutions. Previously it was necessary 
to show either that the institutions had elected voluntarily to cover 
nurses by including them in their compensation policy, or that the 
duties of the particular nurse claimant were essentially those of "la-
borers or workmen."26 The reform is to be welcomed, but the practice 
of piecemeal extension of coverage, based upon organized lobbying 
by particular groups, is to be deplored. The elimination of all exemp-
ions from compulsory coverage should be speedily accomplished.27 
It is said that one of the three main purposes of the workmen's com-
pensation system is rehabilitation, that is, to provide medical and 
vocational help to an injured workman so that he can be restored 
promptly to gainful employment.28 The rights of the injured worker 
and the obligations of insurers in the Massachusetts rehabilitation 
program are provided in Sections 30A-30D of the act.29 However, the 
procedure for enforcing the obligations of the insurer with respect 
to rehabilitation was formerly unclear. By Chapter 773 of the Acts of 
1971,30 the legislature has provided for rehabilitation hearings be-
fore the board and has given the board the power to require an insurer 
to provide for vocational rehabilitation. 
By Chapter 879 of the Acts of 1971,31 the legislature increased the 
weekly incapacity compensation limit from $70 to $77 effective No-
vember 1, 1971, and to $80 effective November 1, 1972. Although the 
amendment increases compensation limits, it still leaves undercom-
pensated the injured worker whose prior earnings exceed $120 per 
week as of November 1, 1972. Even though the act requires the pay-
men~ of two-thirds of the employee's average weekly wage as com-
pensation for total incapacity, the worker whose weekly wage was 
$160 before injury will still, because of the limits on compensation, 
receive only one-half his average wage when the limit is raised to $80. 
The worker whose weekly wage was $240 will receive only one-third 
of his wage as compensation. 
The original 1911 act provided for a weekly compensation equal to 
24 See Hughes, Massachusetts Evidence, 19 Mass. Practice Series §46 ( 1961 ). 
25 AmendingG.L., c. 152, §I. 
26 Brewer's Case, 335 Mass. 601, 141 N.E.2d 281 (1957) (student nurse held employee 
and within class of laborers and workmen). 
27 An amendment to this effect has been entered as House Bill 1857 for the 1972 legis-
lative session. 
28 2 Larson §61.20. 
29 G.L., c. 152, §§30A-30D. 
30AmendingG.L.,c.I52,§30B. 
31 Amending G.L., c. 152, §§34, 34A, 35. 
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one-half of an employee's average weekly wages, but no more than $10 
nor less than $4 per week.32 One-half was changed to two-thirds in 
1914.33 At that time the average wage in the manufacturing industry 
in Massachusetts was about $12 per week, so that almost all injured 
workers received weekly compensation equal to two-thirds of their 
average weekly wage. The system of limiting the maximum weekly 
compensation to a fixed dollar amount has been preserved up to the 
present, although the weekly maximum has been periodically in-
creased by the legislature.34 
The limiting of compensation on a fixed dollar basis has two faults: 
(I) It requires periodic legislative action to increase the weekly maxi-
mum compensation payments to keep pace with increases in the 
wage scale and the cost of living. Legislative action is virtually al-
ways "after the fact," so that the ~eekly maximum falls farther and 
farther behind the level of wages and cost of living. (2) It ensures that 
workers earning high wages will be undercompensated. A better solu-
tion is to eliminate the weekly maximum entirely. The weekly com-
pensation benefits will then automatically be correlated with an em-
ployee's average earnings, which in turn will reflect changes in wage 
levels and in the cost of living. Although this proposal has the twin 
factors of fairness and simplicity, it has not been adopted in any juris-
diction. Presumably no state is willing to suffer a competitive eco-
nomic disadvantage by increasing its compensation so dramatically. 
A federal compensation model, under consideration by the National 
Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws,35 is expected 
to incorporate this concept. 
Chapter 879 of the Acts of 1971 also increased the aggregate limit 
for total incapacity compensation from $16,000 to $20,000 and for 
partial incapacity compensation from $18,000 to $20,000. The restric-
tion of the aggregate benefit to $20,000 means that the injured work-
man will exhaust his benefits in only 250 weeks at $80 per week, or in 
less than 5 years. Thereafter he will have to show that he is totally 
and permanently disabled if he is to receive any further benefits. It 
would be fairer to do away with the maximum period of incapacity, 
as has been done in the case of medical treatment, an area in which 
no limits are presently set.36 The limitations on the weekly compen-
sation payments and on the total compensation payments ought not 
to be allowed to continue; the act should provide for the injured 
workman as long as his handicap and his need persist. 
32St.l9ll,c. 75l,pt.II,§6. 
"St. 1914, c. 708, §2. 
34 See Locke §302 for amendments of the maximum compensation limits from 1927 to 
date. 
35 The commission was established by the Occupation Safety and Health Act of 1970, 
Pub. L. No. 91-596, §27, 84 Stat. 1590. 
36 G.L., c. 152, §30. 
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